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PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT HOPPING: IS THERE A
ROLE FOR ANTITRUST SCRUTINY?
BRET DICKEY
KUN HUANG
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD*
When considering competition policy in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry,
it is important to balance the dynamic effects of new product introductions
(the benefits from innovation) and the static effects of generic entry (the bene-
fits from competition in the form of lower prices). The existing balance is
driven in key part by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which substantially
modified the existing regulatory structure to facilitate competition from ge-
neric drugs, while preserving the incentives to innovate and develop new
medicines that flow from patent protection for branded drugs.
In the context of this unique regulatory structure, a range of conduct by
branded pharmaceutical manufacturers that allegedly inhibits generic compe-
tition has been the subject of frequent antitrust scrutiny by the courts and
extensive attention by antitrust scholars. So-called reverse payment patent set-
tlements are the most well-known,1 but concerns have also arisen in relation to
other forms of conduct, including product hopping, sham litigation, abuse of
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
* Bret Dickey and Kun Huang are economists with Compass Lexecon. Daniel L. Rubinfeld is
Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law and Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, and Professor of Law, New York University. We thank Scott Hemphill, Fiona
Scott Morton, and the ALJ editors for helpful comments, and Ian Todd for capable research
assistance. The authors have consulted for both plaintiffs and defendants on antitrust cases in-
volving allegations of pharmaceutical product hopping. The views and opinions expressed in this
article reflect only those of the authors. Any errors and/or omissions are our own.
1 See, e.g., Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367 (2010); Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003); Robert D. Willig & John
P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST
BULL. 655 (2004); Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating
Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16–23; Barry C. Harris, Kevin M. Murphy, Robert D. Willig
& Matthew B. Wright, Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at
83–89.
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Strategy (REMS) risk management protocol, and abuse of the FDA’s Citizen
Petition process.2
In this article, we focus on so-called product hopping by branded pharma-
ceutical manufacturers. Product hopping is broadly characterized as a branded
manufacturer introducing a minor change to an existing prescription drug
product and substantially shifting sales to the reformulated product, with the
effect of inhibiting emerging competition from a generic version of the origi-
nal branded product.3 Because product hopping involves potentially beneficial
(though incremental) improvements of an existing product, some argue that it
should generally be viewed as per se lawful and see little role for antitrust
intervention.4 On the other hand, because even a trivial reformulation can sub-
stantially inhibit generic competition on the older version of the product,
others argue that product hopping can be anticompetitive and should be sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny.5
Crucial to understanding the debate is the recognition that pharmaceutical
markets are characterized by a disjuncture between who is choosing prescrip-
tion drug products and who is paying for them. In a typical industry, knowl-
edgeable customers are able to compare the prices and qualities of competing
products and are directly responsible for paying for their chosen products. In
the pharmaceutical industry, in contrast, the actor who is most knowledgeable
about the medical benefits of the drugs and who typically makes the drug
choice (i.e., the doctor) is not the entity paying for the drug (i.e., the patient
and/or the health insurer). This “price disconnect” can distort product
purchase decisions and resource allocation.
Moreover, FDA regulations and state substitution laws substantially influ-
ence generic drug approval and generic drug substitution. Combined with the
price disconnect, this regulatory environment can create opportunities for
branded drug manufacturers to “game” the system, by raising the payoffs to
2 For a broad overview of the potential anticompetitive effects of these strategies, see, for
example, Kerstin Noe¨lle Vokinger, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari,
Strategies that Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1665 (2017).
Some cases have alleged that branded manufacturers use a combination of these tactics to delay
generic entry.
3 See, e.g., 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 15-41–15-42 (3d ed. 2017).
4 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Fredrick A. Flyer & Yoad Shefi, Does the FTC’s Theory of
Product Hopping Promote Competition?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 495 (2016); Joshua D.
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s Draft Up-
dated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 1–5 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-31, 2015).
5 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 200–05 (2016); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 3, at 15–44. R
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incremental innovation and potentially encouraging inefficient innovation.
Within the current regulatory framework, it is possible for minimally innova-
tive products to gain substantial sales at the expense of much cheaper generic
medicines and as a result to substantially reduce consumer welfare.
Whether and how this trade-off should be managed as a matter of regula-
tory and/or competition policy is an important question that has yet to be
adequately resolved. Product hopping has received substantial scrutiny in re-
cent years. The FDA has been evaluating the effects of regulatory “gaming”
by branded drug manufacturers and has sought public comment on a variety
of practices, including product hopping.6 The Federal Trade Commission has
expressed the view that “minor, non-therapeutic changes to a “branded phar-
maceutical product that harm generic competition can constitute exclusionary
conduct that violates U.S. antitrust laws.”7
Several courts, including two Circuit courts, have evaluated the competitive
effects of product hopping, with a wide variety of viewpoints being reflected
in the courts’ opinions.8 Some courts advocate a rule of reason analysis, put-
ting substantial weight on the unique characteristics and regulatory framework
of the pharmaceutical industry.9 In some cases, this has led them to conclude
that the incremental innovations were insufficient to balance the static harm to
generic competition.10 Other courts have largely rejected product hopping as a
viable theory of anticompetitive harm, putting less weight on this regulatory
framework.11
6 Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation
and Access, Meeting Notice and Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 22, 2017);
Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Opening Remarks for Part 15 Public Meet-
ing on Generic Drug Competition (July 18, 2017), www.fda.gov/newsevents/speeches/ucm5673
23.htm.
7 FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND
DISTRIBUTION 82 (2018), www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/
overview_pharma_august_2018.pdf.
8 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (Doryx); New
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (Namenda); In re
Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F.Supp.3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (Suboxone), reh’g granted in part
No. 13-MD-2445, 2015 WL 12910728 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2015); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca
Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (Prilosec); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006) (TriCor).
9 For example, the Namenda appellate court agreed with the lower court’s analysis that spe-
cifically took into account the unique regulatory framework in the pharmaceutical industry.
Namenda, 787 F.3d at 655. The Suboxone and TriCor courts expressed similar views. See Subox-
one, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 682–84; TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 422–23.
10 See, e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d at 658–59.
11 For example, the Doryx appellate court minimized the relevance of the regulatory frame-
work in the pharmaceutical industry, endorsing the lower court’s view that faults generic manu-
facturers for not expending resources to promote their generic products, rather than deeming
Defendants’ alleged product hopping as anticompetitive. See Doryx, 838 F.3d at 438–39.
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Antitrust scholars and practitioners have offered a similarly wide range of
analyses of the competitive effects of product hopping. Some scholars view
innovation as generally per se lawful and see little role for antitrust law.12
They argue that if any solution is necessary, it should be a regulatory fix to
prevent gaming of the current system. Others argue for active intervention by
the courts, pointing out that the potential exclusion of generic competition as a
result of product hopping is the type of conduct the Sherman Act seeks to
prevent.13
This article aims to provide an overview of the relevant economic issues
underlying this debate, summarize the existing academic literature, and pro-
vide additional views on policy options that could both protect incentives for
branded drug innovation and preserve the substantial benefits from generic
competition. In what follows, we first describe the unique industry dynamics
of the pharmaceutical industry that must be considered when designing an
appropriate policy. Against that backdrop, we then discuss the substantial ben-
efits that both branded drug R&D and generic drug price competition generate
for consumers. We explain how product hopping has the potential to substan-
tially reduce consumer welfare and examine potential reasons why existing
market participants, such as PBMs, have not been able to adequately address
it. Finally, we evaluate potential regulatory and competition policy solutions.
I. UNIQUE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
In general, new product introductions benefit consumers. In a typical indus-
try, the extent to which the new products lead to increased consumer welfare
can be observed from the decisions in the marketplace. When a company in-
troduces a new product, well-informed consumers weigh the price and fea-
tures of the new product against the price and features of the old product, and
directly and freely make the choice most appropriate for them. Thus, if the
new product is successful, one can infer that it was a product that the market
demanded, and its introduction generated benefits for consumers. If it is not
successful, then one can infer that its introduction failed to generate meaning-
ful benefits to consumers.
The pharmaceutical industry, however, is not typical.14 Drugs are pre-
scribed and distributed through a complex and highly regulated health care
system. Many drugs require a prescription from a doctor before the patient
12 See Carlton et al., supra note 4, at 495; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1–5. R
13 See, e.g., Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 5, at 200–05; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note R
3, at 15–44. R
14 Outside the pharmaceutical industry, there are other circumstances where new product in-
troductions can create competitive problems. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Not Another Drug!
Antitrust for Drug and Other Innovations, ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 39–40.
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can purchase the product. This creates the price disconnect problem men-
tioned earlier. The market participant that makes the product choice (i.e., the
doctor) is not the entity paying for the drug (i.e., the patient/payor) and the
calculus of the doctor may be substantially different than the calculus of the
patient/payor. Doctors are tasked with providing the best care possible for
their patients, and the therapeutic benefits of a drug (and, for example, the
side effects of generating those benefits) typically drive a doctor’s product
choice. The doctor may not adequately consider the price that the patient/
payor will pay. Indeed, given the complexities of the current health insurance
system, prices are often not transparent. There are hundreds or thousands of
different drug formularies across insurance products affecting the net prices
that insurers and patients pay. As a result, even doctors attempting to be well-
informed often will not have good pricing information.15 Thus, the typical
price/quality trade-off faced by consumers in other industries that drives com-
petition does not work the same way here.
Moreover, the current regulatory framework substantially influences ge-
neric drug approval and generic drug substitution. Prior to 1984 both branded
and generic drugs needed to go through an expensive and lengthy approval
process with the FDA before being brought to market. Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, which revised the approval process for generic
drugs to stimulate competition from lower-priced generic drugs while preserv-
ing innovation incentives for branded manufacturers. The Hatch-Waxman Act
allows generic manufacturers to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Applica-
tion (ANDA) when seeking approval for a generic product without the need to
conduct their own clinical trials to independently demonstrate safety and
efficacy.
To obtain approval for an ANDA, the generic manufacturer must show that
its product is pharmaceutically equivalent and bioequivalent to the referenced
branded product. To demonstrate pharmaceutical equivalence, the generic
product must be shown to have the same active ingredient, dosage form,
strength, and route of administration as the branded product. The generic ver-
sion must also be bioequivalent to the branded product, meaning that the ac-
tive ingredients are absorbed by the body at approximately the same rate.
If these requirements are met, the FDA denotes the generic drug as “AB-
rated” to the brand-name drug. An AB-rating signals to consumers, physi-
cians, and pharmacists that the FDA has concluded that the generic drug is
15 See, e.g., G. Michael Allan, Joel Lexchin & Natasha Wiebe, Physician Awareness of Drug
Cost: A Systematic Review, 4 PLOS MED. 1486 (2007).
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therapeutically equivalent and can be used interchangeably with the corre-
sponding branded drug.16
In addition to federal legislation, states have also played an important role
in facilitating generic competition. All 50 states in the United States have
passed generic substitution laws, which permit, and in some cases require,
pharmacists to substitute branded drugs with their AB-rated generic versions
at the pharmacy without the prescribing doctor changing the prescription.17 As
a result of the FDA’s AB rating for generic drugs and these state laws, substi-
tution from branded drugs to their generic versions is, as discussed below,
typically widespread and swift following generic entry, with a large majority
of prescriptions switched to the generic product.
This regulatory framework has strongly encouraged the growth of a generic
manufacturing industry where, rather than developing products that can be
distinguished based on product features or brand, generic manufacturers de-
velop products that are intentionally and effectively identical to the branded
product and to the products of other generic manufacturers.
This business model focuses on keeping costs down and competing aggres-
sively on price. The cost of bringing a generic drug to market, while still
substantial, is much lower now than it was prior to the passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act (when generic drug makers needed to go through the same
clinical trials as the branded companies to prove drug efficacy and safety).
Generic manufacturers’ costs are also relatively low because generics do not
expend substantial resources on marketing and promotion. Instead, generic
manufacturers primarily rely on the mechanism of AB-rated automatic substi-
tution permitted or mandated by the state generic substitution laws to achieve
swift conversion from brand to generic. By the design of the regulatory frame-
work, this is an efficient and effective means for generic manufacturers to
distribute their drugs and bring these savings to consumers.18
16 The FDA maintains a list of patents associated with a branded drug in the Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the Orange Book). U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUA-
TIONS (2018), www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
17 By stating “Dispense as Written” on their scripts, doctors can restrict automatic generic
substitution by the pharmacist. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 68–69 (1985),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-substitution-prescription-drug-prices-
economic-effects-state-drug-product-selection-laws/massonsteiner.pdf.
18 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655–56 (2d Cir. 2015)
(Namenda).
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT HOPPING
A. THE BENEFITS OF INCREMENTAL INNOVATION BY
BRANDED DRUG MANUFACTURERS
Innovation is a critical driver of consumer benefit, especially in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Pharmaceutical research and development is not only time
consuming and expensive, but also only rarely leads to a successful new prod-
uct.19 It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of pharmaceutical inno-
vation takes the form not of new molecules, but rather of modifications of
existing products. These incremental innovations can, for example, change the
form of the medication (e.g., from capsules to tablets), reduce the frequency
with which patients need to take the medication (e.g., from twice per day to
once per day), reduce the amount of active ingredient required to deliver a
particular dosage, extend the time during which the drug is active (e.g., from
immediate release to extended release), or combine with another existing,
complementary medication into a single pill. Pharmaceutical innovation in
general, incremental innovation included, has led to substantial health
benefits.20
Incremental innovation is important in the pharmaceutical industry. Most
incremental innovations generate some procompetitive benefits. A seemingly
modest improvement (e.g., a move from a twice-daily dose to a once-daily
dose) can substantially improve the effectiveness of medication through in-
creased compliance, reduced adverse effects, and/or the ability to treat new
patient populations.21 Small incremental changes can fill unmet needs in the
market. In addition, incremental innovation can help to reduce the overall risk
portfolio of a manufacturer’s R&D projects (which may also include riskier
R&D on potential “breakthrough” drugs). And profits from incremental inno-
vation can help to fund overall R&D activities.
It is important to encourage innovation (including incremental innovation)
by protecting the fruits of research and development through patents and other
intellectual property protection. In doing so, society properly rewards success-
ful innovators for their investment and preserves their innovation incentives.
The policy implication is clear—it is, therefore, essential that competition pol-
icy does not chill the incentive to innovate, even incrementally, in the pharma-
19 See Dickey et al., supra note 1, at 368–69. R
20 See Ernst R. Berndt, Iain M. Cockburn & Karen A. Gre´pin, The Impact of Incremental
Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals: Drug Utilization in Original and Supplemental Indications,
24 PHARMACOECONOMICS 69, 69–73 (2006).
21 See, e.g., id. at 71; INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS, INCREMENTAL INNOVATION:
ADAPTING TO PATIENT NEEDS 12 (2013), www.ifpma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
IFPMA_Incremental_Innovation_Feb_2013_Low-Res.pdf.
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ceutical industry.22 This, however, needs to be balanced against the benefits of
price competition from generic drug manufacturers.
B. THE BENEFITS OF PRICE COMPETITION BY GENERIC
DRUG MANUFACTURERS
While innovation is a critical driver of consumer benefits in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, so too are lower prices from competition by generic competi-
tors. The economic literature reaches several broad and robust conclusions
about the effects of generic competition made possible by the Hatch-Waxman
regulatory framework.23 First, generic drugs are typically offered at a price
that represents a substantial discount off the price of the associated brand-
name drugs. Second, the discount offered by a generic typically increases sub-
stantially with entry by additional generic competitors. Third, lower priced
generic drugs typically obtain a large fraction of total molecule sales within a
short period of time.
The significant savings that consumers have enjoyed as a result of generic
competition have also been well documented in numerous government and
industry studies. For example, a study by the Congressional Budget Office
found that “by substituting generic for brand-name drugs, purchasers saved
roughly $8 billion to $10 billion” in 1994 alone.24 A 2017 study by the Asso-
ciation for Accessible Medicines estimates that “generic medicines generated
$253 billion in savings for patients and taxpayers in 2016,” and that “[i]n the
last decade, the U.S. healthcare system has saved $1.67 trillion due to the
22 Because there are economic benefits from exclusion, the decision as to whether to invest in
developing a reformulated drug may not generate the socially optimal investment (i.e., the in-
vestment decision that would have been made absent the possibility of extending and potentially
growing a firm’s market power). One potential effect is that the branded company might choose
to over-invest in making marginal improvements through reformulations as opposed to develop-
ing potentially important new products. The Namenda court expressed this concern, noting that
“immunizing product hopping from antitrust scrutiny may deter significant innovation by en-
couraging manufacturers to focus on switching the market to trivial or minor product reformula-
tions rather than investing in the research and development necessary to develop riskier, but
medically significant innovations.” Namenda, 787 F.3d at 659.
23 See Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competi-
tion in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation, 18
INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 177, 197–98 (2011); Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry
and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 89–90 (1997); Henry G.
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals
After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 347 (1992); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward,
Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 47–49 (2005); Richard E. Caves,
Michael D. Whinston & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1,
46–47.
24 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AF-
FECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ix (1998).
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availability of low-cost generics.”25 Generic competition on a single molecule
can generate billions of dollars in savings for consumers. For example, ac-
cording to the same study by the Association for Accessible Medicines, entry
by generic versions of the cholesterol blockbuster drug Lipitor in 2011 led to
savings of 97 percent relative to the brand price, totaling $14.4 billion savings
in 2016 alone.26
C. PRODUCT HOPPING CAN HARM COMPETITION
Because both incremental innovation by branded drug manufacturers and
price competition by generic drug manufacturers generate substantial con-
sumer benefits, product hopping presents a difficult policy challenge. Policy
toward product hopping must not undermine the incentives for beneficial in-
cremental innovation. Product hopping, however, has the potential to substan-
tially undermine the consumer benefits of generic drugs.
Even if a reformulated drug product offers little or no benefits, it could be
profitable for a branded drug manufacturer to remove the old product to
preemptively prevent a loss of sales to incoming AB-rated generic products.
Under the existing regulatory framework, a generic product which is AB-rated
to—and therefore automatically substitutable for—an existing branded prod-
uct will not be AB-rated to a modified version of that branded product, even if
the differences are minimal. Thus, it is possible for a branded manufacturer to
render automatic substitution ineffective by introducing a trivial reformula-
tion. With such modifications, the generic product is no longer AB-rated to
the new branded product.27 Developing a generic version of the new branded
product requires a new ANDA application with the FDA and may face addi-
tional hurdles in the form of additional patent litigation and regulatory stays of
generic entry.
To give a concrete but hypothetical example, imagine a branded manufac-
turer of a drug in a 100mg tablet version, where the recommended daily dose
of the drug for all patients is 100mg. Faced with imminent generic competi-
tion, the manufacturer withdraws its 100mg tablet from the market and in-
troduces a 200mg tablet of the same molecule with a score line down the
middle (such that the patient can split the 200mg tablet into two 100mg
25 ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., GENERIC DRUG ACCESS & SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 5 (2017),
accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2017-AAM-Access-Savings-Report-2017-web2
.pdf.
26 Id. at 19.
27 Courts have also noticed that for at least some drugs, there may be substantial switching
costs for patients to “reverse commute” back (i.e., to switch from the original brand to the new
brand, and then to switch back to the generic of the original brand). See, e.g., New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655–56 (2d Cir. 2015) (Namenda).
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doses).28 In this hypothetical, no patients benefit from the new formulation
(because all take a 100mg dose). Yet these patients lose the substantial bene-
fits from generic competition on the older formulation because pharmacies
can no longer automatically substitute the reformulated 200mg tablet with the
100mg generic. The patients, now having been switched to the reformulated
200mg tablet, would require a new prescription from their doctors if they
desire to use the generic 100mg tablet. Absent a justification of significant
benefits from the added score line, this product hopping unambiguously
harms consumers. One can modify this example slightly to consider a world
where a small number of consumers take a 200mg daily dose. In this case,
there could be some small consumer benefit to the new product (e.g., increas-
ing the ease of use for these handful of customers), but this would almost
certainly be substantially outweighed in the aggregate by the loss in consumer
welfare from higher prices.
In reality, most product reformulations likely generate innovative benefits
and harm generic competitors at the same time. The difficult policy problem
is to sort out those cases in which, on net, the reformulation benefits consum-
ers from those cases in which the reformulation harms consumers.
D. THE ROLE OF PBMS AND OTHER MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Perhaps the most interesting economic question related to product hopping
is why the market itself does not solve this problem. As noted, in a “typical”
industry with full information, unrestricted choices and no regulatory barriers
to entry, there is generally little risk that a new product will harm competition.
While that risk is clearly higher in the complex and highly regulated pharma-
ceutical industry because of the doctor-payor “price disconnect,” there are ac-
tors in the prescription drug industry that potentially could be in better
position to appropriately weigh the benefits from the introduction of a new
product with its higher cost.29
There are a small number of closed-model Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs) such as Kaiser Permanente that function as both the prescriber
(where doctors work exclusively for the HMO and are governed by the
HMO’s formulary) and the payor.30 A product-hopping strategy is less likely
to be successful with patients of such an HMO because closed-model HMOs
can better internalize the tradeoffs between cost and medical benefit than
28 This is what is referred to as a “hard switch” but as we discuss later in this article, a “soft
switch” has the potential to lead to similar outcomes.
29 See, e.g., Carlton et al., supra note 4, at 504. R
30 Some scholars have identified HMOs as entities where the “price disconnect” problem does
not occur. See, e.g., Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceu-
tical Markets 24 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings, Working Paper No.
30, 2017); Carlton et al., supra note 4, at 504. R
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other insurance arrangements.31 And they can switch their patients between
drugs more easily. These HMOs, however, are not common and account for
only a small share of prescription drug spending.
More commonly, however, health insurers rely on Pharmacy Benefit Man-
agers (PBMs) to design drug formularies that can affect choices of both pa-
tients (by putting higher cost drugs on higher formulary “tiers” with higher
patient payment responsibilities) and doctors (through “step therapy”32 and
other restrictions that require additional efforts on the part of the doctor to
prescribe higher cost medications). While PBMs can mitigate the price dis-
connect problem through these mechanisms, there still exists a substantial
agency problem, and therefore they do not eliminate it.
Most PBM formularies today rely on “open” formularies, where drugs are
generally included somewhere on the formulary (and therefore reimbursed to
at least some extent by the health insurer), and the PBM uses formulary fea-
tures such as copayments and step therapy to influence prescribing. Doctors
are focused on prescribing the therapeutically best product. Prior authorization
and step therapy can add time and complexity to the prescription process,
thereby providing disincentives to prescribing the higher-cost product.
“Closed” formularies, where the PBM chooses a limited list of drugs that it
will reimburse for in any way, are less common.33 The incentives set up by
tiered, but open, formularies can be vulnerable to actions that change these
incentives. For example, branded manufacturers are increasingly employing
patient copay coupons to reduce or even eliminate the higher copayment that
PBMs and insurers may establish for a non-preferred branded drug.34 Thus,
PBMs can only imperfectly influence the prescribing habits of the doctor us-
ing these tools.
Some have also questioned how effective PBMs are as agents for health
insurers.35 Brand-name manufacturers often pay substantial rebates to PBMs
31 This suggests that the set of drugs on Kaiser’s formulary could be potentially informative in
evaluating a claim whether a follow-on product is sufficiently innovative to warrant substantial
sales.
32 In step therapy, an insurer requires that the patient try a lower cost medication first, and
only if that medication does not work will the insurer reimburse for a higher cost medication.
33 See Aaron Gal, Bernstein Research, Lifecycle Management: Why Does This Still Work?
(2014) (“Most employers are not motivated enough to push for lower drug spend costs (very few
have closed formularies and often reject step edits/prior authorizations).”), masonlec.org/site/rte_
uploads/files/GAI/2014/09.23.14%20Pharmaceutical%20Conference/Panel%202_Gal_Presenta
tion-092314.pdf.
34 See Scott Morton & Boller, supra note 30, at 27. R
35 Some scholars have pointed out that vertical integration between insurers and PBMs, such
as the recent attempt by CVS to purchase Aetna, could increase the incentive to keep drug prices
down. See, e.g., Craig Gartwaite & Fiona Scott Morton, Perverse Market Incentives Encourage
High Prescription Drug Prices, PROMARKET (Nov. 1, 2017), promarket.org/perverse-market-
incentives-encourage-high-prescription-drug-prices/.
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to lower costs in exchange for favorable formulary placement.36 To the extent
that contracts between PBMs and insurers allow PBMs to retain a portion of
the rebates issued by brand manufacturers without fully passing them on to
payors/consumers, PBMs may not be fully incentivized to move consumers
from higher-priced brand products to generics, because generic manufacturers
typically do not pay rebates to PBMs and, even if they do, the lower generic
price may lower the rebates received by the PBMs. A product-hopping strat-
egy may work, given complex contracts between insurers and PBMs that are
not fully transparent about rebates paid to the PBMs and given customers/
employers who are not investing sufficiently in being sophisticated buyers.
Therefore, despite the presence of these agents, it is still possible for a product
hop to be financially successful for a branded manufacturer even where the
social benefits of the new product do not outweigh the higher social costs.37
III. POLICY SOLUTIONS
An appropriate solution to this complex policy problem would reliably dis-
tinguish real innovations from new product introductions that are mere pretext
to avoid generic competition. There are a variety of different approaches that
may be used to address these issues, including facilitating market-based solu-
tions, modifying the existing pharmaceutical regulatory framework, and/or ap-
plying the antitrust laws. While none of these policy solutions are perfect, we
believe that there is a role for careful antitrust scrutiny of product hopping.
A. MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS
Before exploring additional intervention by the regulatory agencies and/or
the courts, it is worth first asking whether there are any additional actions that
market participants can take to further mitigate the effects of product hopping
strategies. While PBMs cannot perfectly eliminate the price disconnect prob-
lem, and do not appear to adequately address the problem of product hopping,
they are arguably in the best position to internalize the tradeoffs between
lower priced generic drugs and incrementally better branded drugs. An impor-
tant next step is to develop a better understanding of exactly why PBMs are
not adequately addressing the problem and whether there are other steps that
could enable them better to address the problem.
36 See Scott Morton & Boller, supra note 30, at 21–23. R
37 See, e.g., Gal, supra note 33, at 1–5. This study examines nine products where reformulated R
branded products faced competition from generic versions of the first-generation branded drugs.
The study conducted a survey asking managed care formulary decision makers why marginally
better second- generation branded drugs retain scripts even after generics are available for the
first-generation drug. The top responses from PBMs include that branded companies are very
effective in convincing physicians to use the reformulated products and that doctors largely resist
therapeutic switches and it is very costly for the PBMs to contact physicians to make the
conversion.
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As discussed above, incentives provided by the open formularies com-
monly adopted by PBMs are imperfect, and branded manufacturers can use a
variety of strategies to mitigate doctors’ and patients’ incentives to switch to
lower-cost generics provided by these formularies. Greater reliance on more
restrictive formularies would potentially enable PBMs to combat product hop-
ping strategies, as it would, for example, reduce the ability of manufacturers
to counteract formulary incentives, though it would also reduce consumer
choice.38
Contracting terms and a lack of price transparency between PBMs and
health insurers could also be contributing to PBM’s effectiveness as agents.
Some scholars have proposed that PBMs and insurers negotiate contracts (ei-
ther voluntarily or through government requirement) that initially pass on in
full to final payors all negotiated rebates and other payments.39 By removing
the information asymmetry regarding rebates, this could allow the payors to
know the true aggregate net price. With full information, the payors subse-
quently can negotiate a transfer of these rebates back to the PBMs to better
incentivize PBMs to bargain with manufacturers and balance the costs and
benefits of branded and generic drugs on behalf of the payors.40
Why market participants have not undertaken all of these steps, and if they
were to do so, how effective these steps would be, remain open questions
which warrant further research.
B. REGULATORY POLICY SOLUTIONS
With non-market options, there are potential benefits to both regulatory and
competition policy solutions.41 The FDA is currently considering how it can
play a role in addressing these issues. In July 2017, the FDA held a public
meeting on balancing the benefits of innovation and generic competition,
where it expressed concerns that some branded manufacturers have been
“‘gaming’ [the drug approval] system” to “deliberately forestall the entry of
expected generic drug competition.”42 It sought public comment on a variety
38 We note that PBMs do appear to be increasingly using formulary exclusions. See Shruti
Desai, The Evolving PBM Market-Trends to Watch, DECISION RESOURCES GROUP: DRG BLOG
(Mar. 23, 2018) decisionresourcesgroup.com/drg-blog/evolving-pbm-market-trends-watch/.
39 See, e.g., Gartwaite & Scott Morton, supra note 35. R
40 Scott Morton & Boller suggest that making the PBM market more competitive would make
PBMs better agents and reduce manufacturers’ incentives to engage in product-hopping strate-
gies. See Scott Morton & Boller, supra note 30, at 38. R
41 For a general discussion of the trade-offs involved, see W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON
& JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 865–99 (4th ed.
2005).
42 Gottlieb, supra note 6. R
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of conduct by branded manufacturers that can delay generic competition, in-
cluding product hopping.43
One way to frame the competitive concern with product hopping is that it is
essentially a means of artificially extending the period of exclusivity (through
the combined effects of patent protection and regulatory protections) beyond
the period envisioned by the compromise struck in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
One could address this issue by modifying certain aspects of the Hatch-Wax-
man Act to create a countervailing reduction in branded drug exclusivity.
However, the change would have effects that go far beyond product hopping
and substantially alter the competitive landscape in the industry. Legislation
could also shorten generic drug approval to mitigate the delay of generic com-
petition caused by product hops. But such a broad policy change would also
affect other drugs not subject to product hops and could have the undesirable
effect of undermining the regulation’s original goal to protect innovation in-
centives by the branded manufacturers. Thus, such a crude regulatory tool
seems to be an ineffective means of addressing a specific problem.
Alternately, a change could be made to FDA regulations that is more fo-
cused on the specific conduct of concern. It could, for example, alter its ap-
proval process for branded drugs whereby it would require a certain threshold
of innovation for a new drug application to be approved.44 But the problems of
finding such an effective regulatory solution are complex. Ex-ante evaluations
of the longer-term benefits of innovative activity involve both economics and
medical science and are substantially more difficult than the short-term evalu-
ations of drug efficacy and safety which the FDA currently regulates.
Another proposal might be for the FDA to modify its definition of thera-
peutic equivalence (i.e., AB-rating) such that a generic product of the original
branded drug is also identified as AB-rated to a newer and only slightly differ-
ent version of the older branded product. However, a change that allowed the
original generic product to be AB-rated to the newer product would raise dif-
ficult issues for the FDA, which would face the task of deciding when such
equivalence should be granted and whether product safety issues would arise.
C. COMPETITION POLICY SOLUTIONS
Given the apparent failure of market participants to adequately combat
product-hopping strategies and the difficulty of designing an effective regula-
tory solution, we view careful intervention by the courts as a potentially via-
43 Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation
and Access, supra note 6. R
44 See Steve D. Shadowen, Keith B. Leffler & Joseph T. Lukens, Bringing Market Discipline
to Pharmaceutical Product Reformulations, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 698
(2011) (discussing the use of this type of approach in other countries).
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ble approach to scrutinizing product hopping issues.45 The potentially
anticompetitive exclusion of generic competition through product hopping
tactics is the type of conduct antitrust law addresses. Moreover, the existence
of complex regulations in the pharmaceutical industry does not by itself pre-
vent an application of antitrust analysis to this industry. Rather, it means that
antitrust analysis needs to be tailored to account for the regulatory environ-
ment of the pharmaceutical industry (and that the inferences drawn from that
analysis should not necessarily be applied to other industries).
1. What Is the Appropriate Antitrust Standard?
If an antitrust approach is to be used, how do we determine the appropriate
standard? To begin, because product hopping based on trivial innovations can
adversely affect generic competition and deprive consumers of large savings,
per se legality for pharmaceutical innovation is not an appropriate standard for
product hopping.
If a per se standard is not appropriate, it follows that competition authorities
and the courts will likely need to undertake a difficult evaluation of product
hopping under a rule of reason standard.46 Identifying potentially anticompeti-
tive product hops will, of course, raise challenging questions. But so too do
many of the intellectual property-antitrust issues that the competition agencies
and the courts have faced.47 Operating within the confines of antitrust law
would offer additional advantages. The courts would be evaluating cases in
light of existing competition case law, not regulatory case law, a task that
several courts have already undertaken.48 In that context, it will be natural for
the court to decide whether a pure balancing test is appropriate or, as we
discuss below, a clearer standard should be applied. In fact, courts have done
it: the TriCor court embraced a rule-of-reason analysis,49 and the Namenda
court raised the question whether the defendant’s switch “makes economic
sense in the absence of the benefit derived from eliminating generic
competition.”50
45 For a broader discussion of the challenges of regulatory solutions and the resulting impor-
tance of antitrust scrutiny, including product hopping as a specific example, see Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).
46 We omit here a discussion of the possible use of a “quick look” modification of the rule of
reason.
47 To name a few, consider the current case against Qualcomm, the prior investigations of
Intel and Google, and the analysis of the Google acquisition of Motorola. FTC v. Qualcomm
Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2017 WL 2774406 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017); Motorola Mobility
LLC, FTC No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 124100 (Jan. 3, 2013); Intel Corp., 150 F.T.C. 420, 2010
WL 9549985 (Oct. 29, 2010).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
49 Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 432 F.Supp.2d 408, 422 (D. Del. 2006) (TriCor).
50 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2015)
(Namenda).
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We realize that a balancing test can confront competition agencies or the
courts with difficult analytical questions, particularly with evaluating the
procompetitive effects of innovation or efficiencies of the alleged conduct.51
We discuss several tests that attempt to make this task more administrable
below.
2. Should the Tactics Used to Achieve the Switch Be the Primary Focus?
One distinction among product-hopping tactics that has received substantial
attention in the analysis of the competitive effects of product hopping is the
difference between a “hard switch” and a “soft switch.”52 In a “hard switch,”
the branded manufacturer stops selling the old product to the market (typically
just prior to generic entry) and only sells the new product. In a “soft switch,”
the branded manufacturer keeps the old product on the market but encourages
doctors to prescribe, and patients to use, the reformulated version (through
pricing, marketing, and other business strategies).
Hard switches have been viewed by some with particular suspicion as a
type of coercion, where consumer choice is unambiguously reduced and the
market is not allowed to decide the relative benefits of the old and the new
product, but where the only branded choice is the new product.53 By the same
logic, soft switches have been viewed by some as generally procompetitive
because the market is allowed to make this decision.
This distinction, however, ignores the importance of automatic substitution
in generating the competitive benefits from generic entry. Whether the switch
is hard or soft, it prevents generic manufacturers from taking full advantage of
the mechanism of competition around which their development of the product
was premised. While generic versions of the older product can still compete
with the newer branded product, they are not automatically substitutable.54 It
is the interference of this automatic substitution mechanism that has the larg-
est effect on generic competition, not the specific set of tactics used.55
51 Professor Gilbert, recognizing the difficulty of quantifying the value of innovation, pro-
poses a “weighted rule of reason” standard, with which “the fact-finder should credit the innova-
tion with an additional weight to reflect the likelihood that the fact-finder may underestimate its
social contribution.” Gilbert, supra note 14, at 41. He acknowledges that “it is not immune to R
error and is likely to be difficult to implement in many circumstances.” Id. at 42.
52 For example, contrast Prilosec, Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d
146, 148–49 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasizing soft switches), with Namenda, 787 F.3d at 642–43
(emphasizing hard switches).
53 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 654–55.
54 See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 5, at 217–19. R
55 The other side of this coin is that the potential for anticompetitive effects is substantially
smaller when generic manufacturers do not rely heavily upon automatic substitution. Some have
suggested that product hopping may also be a concern in the biologics industry. See, e.g., Scott
Morton & Boller, supra note 30, at 25. But there is no automatic substitution of biosimilars (the R
biologic equivalent to generic drugs) and while the biologics industry faces many of the same
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Some economists argue that generic manufacturers are simply victims of
their own business strategy of not investing in sufficient promotional effort
for their generic products.56 But this view fails to consider the reasons why it
would not be effective and profitable for generic manufacturers to market
their drugs to physicians to compete with the reformulated branded version.
The current statutory and regulatory environment is designed to encourage the
entry of generic products that compete not by differentiating themselves, but
by ensuring they are identical (i.e., AB-rated) to the brand and to other gener-
ics of the same molecule. Where multiple AB-rated generics are present (or
even a single generic competitor and the prospect of an authorized generic
being introduced by the branded manufacturer), a single generic competitor
marketing the product could not prevent free riding of other generic manufac-
turers on these marketing efforts, and therefore much of any demand-enhanc-
ing effects of promotion could be reaped by other AB-rated competitors. It is
for this same reason that branded manufacturers typically stop or substantially
reduce marketing efforts upon entry by the first generic manufacturer.57
Shifting patients to a trivially reformulated product prior to generic entry,
regardless of whether a hard switch or a soft switch is employed, could have
the same effect of undermining the automatic substitution mechanism envi-
sioned by the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Namenda and other courts appear to
immunize from antitrust liability product hops that involve only a “soft
switch.”58 In our view, such a treatment of soft switches would have the po-
tential to allow product hops that harm consumers because it ignores the spe-
cific industry dynamics of the highly regulated pharmaceutical industry.59
industry characteristics as the small-molecule pharmaceutical industry, the potential competitive
effects of product hopping would appear to be much smaller there.
56 See, e.g., Carlton et al., supra note 4, at 501; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 3. R
57 See Caves et al., supra note 23, 39–42. R
58 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 654–55 (2d Cir. 2015)
(Namenda); Prilosec, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151–152. Professor Gilbert has suggested an “‘almost
safe’ harbor[ ]” for soft switches, because “the balance of enforcement risks favors shielding soft
switches from aggressive antitrust enforcement.” Gilbert, supra note 14, at 42–43. However, he R
also points out that it is not the case that “a soft switch eliminates the possibility of consumer
harm.” Gilbert, supra note 14, at 43. R
59 We also note that there may be issues with the timing safe harbor, such as that proposed by
Carrier and Shadowen. The authors propose a safe harbor for a brand manufacturer if it in-
troduces a reformulated drug outside a “Generic Window” that begins 18 months before and
ends 30 months after the first generic ANDA application. See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 5, R
at 207–09. While a safe harbor based on such a “four–year generic window” has intuitive appeal
(e.g., it may allow sufficient amount of time for generic competitors to modify their ANDAs to
match the reformulated brand products), it is out of the branded manufacturer’s control to obtain
such an immunity because the timing of generic ANDA filing may not be predictable, which in
turn undermines one of the very purposes of a safe harbor. In addition, such a safe harbor ignores
the possibility that a generic competitor’s ANDA filing decision might be endogenous to the
branded company’s introduction of a reformulation—this could result in immunization of prod-
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Furthermore, a competitive analysis that emphasizes the distinction be-
tween hard switches and soft switches opens the door to a variety of difficult
questions as to which tactics are allowed and which are not for shifting sales
from an old product to a new one: Is the firm required to keep the old product
on the market? How long should the old product stay on the market? Can the
branded company stop promoting its old product? Should branded companies’
marketing or pricing activities for the reformulated products be limited? In
addition, there are circumstances in which removing the old product from the
market may be procompetitive. For example, if the branded manufacturer be-
lieves that the reformulated product is clearly a better product, a hard switch
may be an efficient way to overcome consumer inertia. Thus, overemphasiz-
ing the distinction between hard switches and soft switches could have the
danger of distorting procompetitive incentives of a branded company to ap-
propriately move the market to a newer, and better, product.
To be clear, there may be extreme tactics that a branded manufacturer could
undertake in a “hard switch” that would appear to have no legitimate procom-
petitive motivations— as in our earlier hypothetical—–where the primary ef-
fect is to inhibit the generic’s ability to use automatic substitution. In these
rare instances the hard nature of the switch could be an important factor in
assessing competitive effect. Otherwise, as discussed elsewhere, an important
focus should be on the nature of the new product introduction itself.
3. Searching for a Clearer Test?
It is difficult to perform a full balancing test. For the reasons discussed
above, an alternative, and potentially effective, test could instead focus on the
benefits (or lack thereof) of the new product. There are several variants of this
test. The least restrictive version is a “sham innovation” standard, which
would ask whether the innovation makes at least some consumers better off.60
This would essentially only condemn those new products which are not inno-
vative in any way and merely a pretext for avoiding generic competition.
However, almost all innovations can be characterized as beneficial in at least
some small way to at least some small subset of patients (e.g., some patients
may better tolerate a tablet form of a drug, while others may better tolerate a
capsule form, so a switch from one to the other—in either direction—could
pass the sham innovation test). Thus, while conduct that fails this test would
uct hops for which further antitrust scrutiny is warranted. A safe harbor for an introduction of
reformulated products that occurs after generic entry is immune to these problems.
60 See, e.g., Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2007, at 61–62; Jack E. Pace III & Kevin C. Adam, Doryx, Namenda, and
Coercion: Understanding and Un-Tying Product-Hopping Litigation, ANTITRUST, Summer 2018,
at 28; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 4–5. R
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clearly harm consumers, such a test would not sufficiently deter potentially
anticompetitive behavior.
A somewhat more restrictive variant of a sham innovation standard that
would still give branded manufacturers a wide berth to develop incremental
innovations is the “no-economic-sense” test.61 Under such a test, the plaintiff
must show that the alleged product hop would not be profitable without the
effect of inhibiting generic competition of the old product. In other words, the
plaintiff would be required to show that ex ante (i.e., at the time of the product
reformulation) the branded manufacturer expected that its R&D and regula-
tory costs of bringing the reformulated drug to market exceed the expected
incremental profit from the market-expanding (and/or price-increasing) ef-
fects of the drug and therefore the new product introduction made no eco-
nomic sense without the exclusionary effect on generic competition.62
A no-economic-sense test is a more conservative test relative to a full bal-
ancing test. A full balancing test would also take into account the negative,
and potentially large, effect of product hops on consumer welfare resulting
from the impediment of generic competition. Thus, in cases of relatively mi-
nor incremental reformulations, a branded manufacturer is more likely to pass
the no-economic-sense test than the full balancing test.
A no-economic-sense test places substantial burdens on the plaintiff and
focuses on the benefits of the new product to the manufacturer, which would
give substantial weight to avoiding Type 1 errors (wrongly imposing liability
on new drug innovations that benefit consumers) while still considering Type
2 errors (failing to impose liability when the new drug introduction has an-
ticompetitive effect). Furthermore, it moves the debate away from a primary
focus on the hard switch-soft switch distinction and it reduces need for the
61 One version of such a test is formulated in Carrier & Shadowen. Carrier & Shadowen,
supra note 5, at 210–12. Note that one should not confuse a no-economic-sense test with a profit- R
sacrifice test, although sometimes they are used interchangeably. A profit-sacrifice test asks if
the alleged conduct sacrifices part of the profit that could be earned under competitive circum-
stances to induce exit and gain consequent additional monopoly profit. See Janusz A. Ordover &
Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91
YALE L.J. 8, 9–10 (1981). However, as Gilbert points out, a “profit sacrifice test has inherent
limitations to evaluate anticompetitive innovation” because “[i]nnovation is about sacrificing
short-term profits for long-term rewards.” Gilbert, supra note 60, at 57–58. The no-economic- R
sense test, in contrast, asks “not just whether challenged conduct is profitable, but also why it is
profitable.” Gregory J. Werden, The “No Economic Sense” Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J.
CORP. L. 293, 300 (2006); see also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under
Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006).
62 The Namenda court applied a “no-economic-sense” test to the withdrawal of the older prod-
uct. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 659 (“Defendants fail to explain why the potential [redacted] in
additional XR sales that they stood to earn—which is less than the approximately $1.5 billion in
annual sales they have made from Namenda IR in recent years—makes economic sense in the
absence of the benefit deprived from eliminating generic competition.”).
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court to evaluate each individual tactic that the branded manufacturer may
have used to encourage customers to switch to the reformulated product. Fi-
nally, it would provide a relatively clear standard that innovators could evalu-
ate ex ante when bringing a new product to market.63
There are potentially difficulties with a no-economic-sense standard. We
are aware, that in United States v. Microsoft the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals
advocated a balancing test, rather than a no-economic-sense test.64 The no-
economic-sense test may also be challenging to implement in practice (al-
though less challenging than a full balancing test). We note as well that there
can be counterexamples where a party could fail the no-economic-sense test,
even though the new product still benefits some customers. For example, a
product with a new reformulation may attract $50 million new sales but cost
$70 million to manufacture and market. It fails the no-economic-sense test,
but the $50 million in new sales yield benefits to new customers that may
outweigh the higher prices (relative to the case without generic exclusion)
some customers pay. This results in an undesirable “false positive.” In this
example, it is true that the manufacturer will find it profitable only if its new
product could simultaneously attract new customers and “exclude” some ge-
neric competition. But, such a reformulation may very well pass a balancing
test that focuses on consumer welfare.65
IV. CONCLUSION
While incremental innovation can bring substantial benefits to consumers,
product hopping can also reduce the benefits of generic competition. Further
research is warranted to understand why the market does not appear to be
adequately addressing this practice. We have considered several potential pol-
icy solutions to this complex issue. Although not without its difficulties, we
view careful antitrust intervention by the courts as a potentially viable ap-
proach to scrutinizing product hopping, and a more promising approach than
regulatory solutions. When a full-blown rule of reason analysis is not feasible,
we favor some form of a no-economic-sense test to evaluate product hopping.
In the end, failing a no-economic-sense test does not offer a sufficient con-
dition for antitrust liability. But, it could serve as a screen to identify situa-
tions where product hopping is unlikely to harm competition. We take this
conservative approach because if the court were to use such a test to deter-
mine antitrust liability (i.e., failing this test would mean antitrust violation), it
63 Such a test could provide incentives for branded manufacturers to generate overly optimis-
tic projections of incremental sales generated by the new product.
64 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
65 Conversely, a product hop that passes the no-economic-sense test in theory may very well
be condemned under a balancing test.
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would have to accept the risk of “false positives.” While competition policy
should as a general matter give broad freedom to firms to introduce new prod-
ucts, the enormous magnitude of drug spending and the potential for product
hopping strategies to substantially reduce consumer welfare suggest that the
cost of having no antitrust rule to address product hopping could be danger-
ously high.66
66 For a thoughtful view of how such a no-economic-sense test can be applied in the context of
evaluating exclusive dealing arrangements, see A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agree-
ments and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
375 (2006). For the view that exclusion occurs with little or no sacrifice, see Susan A. Creighton,
D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 975 (2005).

